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Summary 
In this paper it is shown that the most rational of all creatures, Homo Oeconomicus, can be 
enticed to freely engage in an activity that is guaranteed to lead to his ruin. It is furthermore 
shown that this is possible if and only if utility functions are unbounded. The paper thus develops 
an argument in favour of bounded utility functions.  
 
Introduction 
It is well known that the Devil possesses infinite, though not supreme, power, wealth and 
knowledge as well as infinite life. It is also known that he derives his pleasures from making 
other creatures miserable; however, when it comes to creatures endowed with free will, he cannot 
do anything unless they freely agree to it. The Devil cannot simply force a person to act in 
accordance with his wishes. This can be very frustrating to the Devil, but in this short paper a 
strategy is presented whereby the Devil can circumvent this problem and thus, even –or 
especially– the most rational of all creatures can be brought to misery and ruin none the less. 
Homo Oeconomicus is considered the most rational of all creatures. He has perfect 
insight into his preferences and at all times coolly uses his flawless reason to make the most of his 
situation: he is the perfect expected utility maximiser. As any standard economic textbook will 
tell you, his utility function with respect to wealth is strictly concave and non-negative. 1 Usually 
no assumptions are made with respect to boundedness, and, for now, we shall assume that there is 
no upper bound.2 For Homo Oeconomicus’s utility function, U(x), where x is his wealth, the 
following holds: U(x) ≥ 0, U’(x) > 0, U”(x) < 0. This is not only known to Homo Oeconomicus, 
but it is also known to the Devil, whose infinite knowledge of course encompasses the wisdom 
laid down in standard economic textbooks.  
Now assume the Devil offers Homo Oeconomicus the following wager, R: 
With 99,9% probability the Devil will increase the wealth of Homo Oeconomicus 100 fold, while, 
                                                     
1
 Note that this kind of utility function implies that Homo Oeconomicus is risk averse. 
2
 I shall argue that it is in fact better to assume that utility functions are bounded. In order to derive this 
conclusion, I shall show that unboundedness of the utility function leads to problematic results. 
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with 0,1% probability, Homo Oeconomicus will lose everything. As is well known, the Devil is 
an evil bastard, but an honourable one who does not cheat,3 so that Homo Oeconomicus can 
legitimately assume that the chance experience will be carried out faithfully with the probabilities 
proposed by the Devil. Suppose that Homo Oeconomicus deduces that the expected utility of 
accepting this wager is larger than the utility he derives from his present wealth: E(U(R)) = 
0,999·U(100·x) + 0,001·U(0) > E(U(x)) = U(x).4 Then, being the cool, collected, rational creature 
he is, he will freely choose to engage in this lottery. 
Now assume the Devil offers him this lottery again and again; then at some point, either 
Homo Oeconomicus will lose or he will decide not to engage in this wager anymore because he 
has become so wealthy that the 99,9% probability of multiplying his wealth 100 times no longer 
outweighs the risk of losing it all, even though the probability of the latter is only 0,1%. But 
suppose that were this to happen, the Devil simply ups the multiplication factor to a level such 
that Homo Oeconomicus’s expected utility of accepting the wager is higher than his present 
utility. Given the structure of the utility function, this is always possible, and thus the Devil can 
keep Homo Oeconomicus playing until the time comes that he loses, which will certainly (i.e. 
with probability 1) happen at some point. 
This strategy allows the Devil to ruin Homo Oeconomicus -and thus bring him misery- 
with certainty, without violating the condition that Homo Oeconomicus must freely choose to 
participate. In other words, the perfect rational being, Homo Oeconomicus, is willing to play a 
game in which his optimal strategy is guaranteed to leave him ruined.  
 
Existing Paradoxes 
Many paradoxes are known in the literature on decision making. Undoubtedly one of the 
most famous ones is the St. Petersburg paradox, and this paradox, at first glance, seems closely 
related to what is happening here. None the less, there are some essential differences. In the St. 
Petersburg paradox the paradoxical result is obtained by a steady contribution to the expected 
value of the lottery by each possible outcome.5 As the probability of a certain outcome is the 
inverse of the amount of utility that outcome brings, every outcome contributes 1 to the expected 
value of the lottery. As the number of possible outcomes is infinite, the expected value of the 
                                                     
3
 Mainly because he does not have to. 
4
 If this is not the case, assume that the Devil will not increase his wealth 100 fold, but 1000 or 10000 fold 
or whatever the amount necessary for this equation to hold. Given the structure of U(x), such a 
multiplication factor can always be found. 
5
 Here the version of the St. Petersburg paradox is used that is adjusted for concave utility functions (see, 
for instance, Mas-Colell et. al. (1995)). 
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lottery is infinite too. This result is regarded as a paradox because it implies that a rational being 
would be willing to pay any amount to be allowed to play this lottery, knowing that this is most 
likely to lead to huge losses. As the paradox does not occur when utility functions are bounded, 
the St. Petersburg paradox can be used as an argument in favour of adding the assumption that 
Homo Oeconomicus’s utility function is bounded (cf. Mas-Colell et al. (1995)). 
The main result of this paper (to be presented below) gives further support to this 
argument. Nonetheless, the St. Petersburg lottery differs on some essential points from the game 
constructed by the Devil.6 Not only is the contribution to the expected utility of each (finite) 
outcome 0 (leading to the certainty of total ruin instead of only a very high likelihood of a very 
big loss), the expected utility of this sequence of wagers need not be infinite either. In fact, it can 
be shown that it need only be marginally larger than the utility derived from the initial 
endowment of Homo Oeconomicus (see Appendix A). In other words, the reward in terms of 
expected utility that Homo Oeconomicus demands for engaging in a lottery that will certainly 
lead to his ruin is arbitrarily small.  
The paradox that seems closest to what is happening in this story is the ‘ever-better-
wine’-paradox introduced by Pollock (1983). This paradox is derived as follows: suppose a wine 
lover has a bottle of wine that gets better and better each day it remains unopened. Suppose 
furthermore that the increase in its quality is such that it outweighs any loss of utility the wine 
lover may experience by forgoing the present consumption of the wine in favour of consuming it 
the next day. Then it is rational for the wine lover to forgo drinking the wine today in favour of 
letting it get even better. This holds, however, for each day that he would think of consuming the 
wine. As a result he never gets to drink the wine. 
There seems to be a similarity between the decision to stop playing in the story of Homo 
Oeconomicus’s encounter with the Devil and the decision to drink the wine in the puzzle by 
Pollock. However, an essential difference is that in Pollock’s story there is no risk of loss, the 
higher utility that can be achieved in the future is guaranteed, though never attained if one never 
decides to drink, whereas in the case of Homo Oeconomicus, no such certainty exists. In fact, the 
only certainty is ruin. 
 
Devil-proofness 
Having thus constructed a strategy that allows the Devil to ruin any specimen of the 
Homo Oeconimicus species he comes across, it is interesting to try to discover if there are 
                                                     
6
 The strategy adopted by the Devil is, in fact, a kind of Martingale system, which he, because of his 
infinite wealth, can maintain. 
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augmentations of the Homo Oeconomicus species possible that are not susceptible to this kind of 
demonic mischief. For this it is useful to keep in mind that the Devil will only engage in lotteries 
with human beings if he is certain he will win. The utter humiliation that comes with losing to a 
mortal is something an infinite being simply cannot afford to risk.7   
There are a number of aspects of Homo Oeconomicus that affect his resistance to the 
Devil. One assumption that can be dropped is the continuity condition. This will render invalid 
the conclusion that the expected utility of the wager R* can be as close to U(x0) -the utility of 
Homo Oeconomicus’s initial wealth- as we like as we can no longer control the εi’s in 11. (see 
Appendix A), but if strict monotonicity is maintained (along with the other assumptions), so will 
be the guarantee of ruin. As such, it does not provide an adequate defence against the Devil.  
An obvious solution to Homo Oeconomicus’s plight would be assuming that there is a 
maximum to the level of utility Homo Oeconomicus can derive from wealth. When this 
maximum is attained, or approximated closely enough, there is no way the Devil can seduce 
Homo Oeconomicus into accepting yet another wager. Assuming there is a maximum level of 
utility that can be attained is sufficient to show that there is a positive probability that the Devil 
will fail to achieve his objective of ruining Homo Oeconomicus, as it is then certain that this 
maximum will also be attained (or approximated closely enough) with some positive probability. 
This follows from the fact that Ut as defined in Appendix A is a divergent sequence.8  
Assuming that there is a maximum to the level of utility that can be derived from wealth, 
however, seems a rather overzealous approach to solving the problem. While maintaining the 
position that human beings –at least at some point- should just be content with what they have, 
may be a position that seems appealing to some philosophers and moralists, most economists will 
be very wary of this limitation on human desires. Assuming that there is a maximum to the utility 
that a person can achieve implies dropping the property of (local) non-satiability9, a property that 
is –often implicitly– used in the derivation of  many economic theorems and results. Furthermore, 
unlimited human greed is often regarded as ensuring the continuance of economic development. 
The insatiability property may very well be worth saving if this is possible - and it is. 
 
Conclusion: boundedness of the utility function 
                                                     
7
 Note that as long as the game (or the lottery) is in progress, the Devil hasn’t lost and that the Devil’s 
infinite powers enable him to postpone the death of any living creature indefinitely. 
8
 The possibility that Homo Oeconomicus will stop playing just short of having attained the maximum 
results from the fact that Ut (as opposed to the utility function U(x)) is not continuous but contains jumps.  
9
 See Varian (1992). 
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In order to ensure ruin, it must be possible that the Devil can always entice Homo 
Oeconomicus to engage in yet another round of play. This implies the following: 
• )()'(:'..)1,0( xUxUpxxtsp >⋅∃∀∈∃ 10 
This property we shall call demonic susceptibility.11 It is then possible to prove the following 
theorem: 
 
Theorem:  Homo Oeconomicus suffers from demonic susceptibility if and only if his utility 
function U is unbounded. 
 
Proof: see Appendix B. 
 
The fact that the certainty of ruin can only be attained if the utility function is unbounded 
can be used as an argument for adding the assumption of bounded utility functions to the standard 
version of Homo Oeconomicus.12 A similar recommendation has also been proposed based on the 
results from the St. Petersburg Paradox (see, for instance, Mas-Colell et al.(1995)).13 The 
argument presented in this paper is stronger, however, as it does not use infinite expected utility 
as the St. Petersburg Paradox does, and because engaging in an activity that will lead to certain 
ruin is even more serious then engaging in an activity that will, with a high probability, lead to a 
very big loss.14 
 
                                                     
10
 Note that we are assuming neither continuity, nor that x’ > x. The latter does seem reasonable, but it is 
not necessary to achieve the result of certain ruin to assume that U is monotonously increasing. If this is not 
the case, the Devil may increase utility by offering to take away money from Homo Oeconomicus. 
Admittedly, however, this would make for very strange utility functions. 
11
 It might be argued that the Devil can also ensure that Homo Oeconomicus keeps playing by adjusting the 
probability of winning. This is true, but ruin would then no longer be guaranteed.  
Adjustments of the probability of outcomes also feature in other paradoxes presented by Pollock (1983), in 
particular in the dare-devil moving ever closer to the edge. 
12
 An objection that is often raised against these kinds of paradoxes is that the amount of money, or in this 
case wealth, in the world is limited. As a result the paradox could not occur. In this light it is worth 
noticing, however, that for any ‘normal’ utility function (i.e. those without a vertical asymptote), the 
assumption of a limited domain on x implies that U is bounded. As such, this remark does therefore not 
affect the central result of this paper.   
13
 Although the assumption of boundedness does not affect many of the main results in economic theory, 
the assumption may prove problematic in other fields of decision theory (see, for instance, Jeffrey 1983). I 
thank Richard Bradley for pointing this out to me.  
14
 I wish to thank Jan-Willem Romeijn, Boudewijn de Bruin and Barteld Kooi for their helpful comments 
on earlier versions of this paper. 
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Appendix A: Deriving the price of certain ruin 
In this appendix we shall derive the price of certain ruin - that is, the amount of additional 
expected utility that has to be dangled in front of Homo Oeconomicus in order to get him to 
accept the lottery that will certainly lead to his own ruin. To derive this price, we shall first write 
down this problem in a more precise way. 
The following assumptions are made:  
1. 0)0(;0)(",0)(',0)(:0 =<>>>∀ UxUxUxUx ,  U(x) is unbounded. (x is 
Homo Oeconomicus’s wealth).  
2. The probability of winning p is between naught and one and remains fixed 
throughout the rounds of play: )1,0(∈p . 
3. The initial wealth of Homo Oeconomicus is positive: x0 > 0. 
Let t denote the round of play, and xt be the wealth of Homo Oeconomicus at time t. Then the 
multiplication factor at of the wealth in case of winning is determined by:  
4. 




≥⋅⋅<⋅
=
∏ ∏
−= =1..0 ..0
00
0
,1)()(..
1
ti ti
iit tforaxUpaxUtsa
a
 
A reformulation of this problem as a single compound lottery will be introduced later, but for now 
let us focus at the repeated offers made by the Devil. For notational ease, we define 
)(
..0
0 ∏
=
⋅=
ti
it axUU , the amount of utility that is achieved after the t’th round of play, 
conditional on the fact that Homo Oeconomicus has not lost any of the previous rounds.  
Since multiplications of 0 remain 0, we can denote the expected utility of each strategy of 
Homo Oeconomicus by the number of the round in which he stops. This will be denoted as St. For 
each strategy, the expected utility is then given by: 
5. .))(( ttt UpSUE ⋅=  
By construction we know:   
6. E(U(St)) < E(U(St+1)) ∀ t. 
This implies that the strategy of never stopping (S∞ ) is indeed the dominant strategy. The 
expected utility of this strategy is: 
7. )(limlim))((
..0
0 ∏
=
∞→∞→
∞
⋅⋅=⋅=
ti
i
t
t
t
t
t
axUpUpSUE . 
Analogously to the story behind the St. Petersburg paradox, we can construct a single 
compounded lottery. Let us assume we toss a not necessarily balanced coin, so that the chance it 
comes up heads is somewhere between 0 and 1 (and is known). If it comes up heads, all of Homo 
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Oeconomicus’s wealth is eliminated. If it comes up tails, his wealth is multiplied by ai and the 
coin is tossed again. This lottery -let us denote it by R*-  then has the same expected utility as S∞, 
which by definition is larger than the expected utility Homo Oeconomicus derives from his initial 
endowment, U(x0). It is therefore rational for Homo Oeconomicus to accept this lottery, even 
though it leads to certain ruin. 
It may be argued that this is not that surprising, as it is not necessarily irrational to engage 
in a lottery with infinite expected utility even if the chance of winning is infinitesimally small. 
While it is indeed clearly possible to construct at’s in such a way that the expected utility of this 
lottery/strategy will equal infinity, this need not be the case. It is possible to generate at’s in such 
a way that this expected utility is finite. In fact, we can reduce it to only marginally more than the 
initial utility of Homo Oeconomicus: U(x0).  
In order to do this, let us return to 4. From this we know that: 
8. 011 >=−⋅⇔>⋅ ++ tttttt someforUUpUUp εε . 
We furthermore know that we can give εt > 0 any value we like by choosing at+1 accordingly. So 
let εt> 0. Then we can also express 8. by: 
9. 
pp
UUUUpUUp ttttttttt
ε
εε +=⇔+=⋅⇔=−⋅ +++ 111   . 
From this we can, after some elementary calculations, deduce 10.: 
10. 




>⋅+
=
=⋅ ∑
=
−
−
0)(
0
..1
1
10
0
tpU
tU
Up
ti
i
i
t
t
ε  
and then 7. can be rewritten as: 
11. 
∑
∑∏
∞
=
−
−
=
−
−
∞→
=
∞→∞→
∞
⋅+=
⋅+=⋅⋅=⋅=
1
1
10
..1
1
10
..0
0
)(
)(lim)(limlim))((
i
i
i
ti
i
i
t
ti
i
t
t
t
t
t
pU
pUaxUpUpSUE
ε
ε
 
For sufficiently small εi’s, this summation will converge. Furthermore, as we can choose the εi’s 
as small as we like, we can also reduce this summation ad libidinem.  
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Appendix B: Proof of the theorem. 
UBSD ⇒..  Suppose:  Homo Oeconomicus suffers from demonic susceptibility, i.e. 
)()(:..)1,0( xUyUpyxtsp >⋅∃∀∈∃  
  Let p’ be that p.   
 Suppose: U is bounded. 
  Then: .)(:.. MxUxtsM ≤∀∃  
  Let M be the smallest upper bound of U. 
  Let x be such that .')( MpxU ⋅≥  This must be possible, or M would 
not be the smallest upper bound. 
  Then, according to the first premise, Homo Oeconomicus’s demonic 
susceptibility:  
  MpxUyUptsy ⋅≥>⋅∃ ')()('..  
which implies: MyU >)(  
  Which implies a contradiction, as M is an upper bound of U. 
   
..SDUB ⇒  Suppose:  U is unbounded. 
  Then: MyUtsyM >∃∀ )(.. (2) 
  We will show that it is possible to keep constructing new wagers that 
are agreeable to Homo Oeconomicus for every )1,0(∈p . 
  So let )1,0(∈p  
  Let ℜ∈x + 
  Take pxUM /)(=  
  Take MyUtsy >)(.. , which is possible because of the 
unboundedness of U. 
  Then )()( xUMpyUp =⋅>⋅  
  So )()(:..)1,0( xUyUpyxtsp >⋅∃∀∈∃  
  Q.e.d. 
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